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ABSTRACT: 
This paper offers an expressivist account of logical form, arguing that in order to fully 
understand it one must examine what valid arguments make us do (or: what Achilles does and 
the Tortoise doesn‟t, in Carroll‟s famed fable). It introduces Charles Peirce‟s distinction between 
symbols, indices and icons as three different kinds of signification whereby the sign picks out its 
object by learned convention, by unmediated indication, and by resemblance respectively. It is 
then argued that logical form is represented by the third, iconic, kind of sign. It is noted that 
icons uniquely enjoy partial identity between sign and object, and argued that this holds the key 
to Carroll‟s puzzle. Finally, from this examination of sign-types metaphysical morals are drawn: 
that the traditional foes metaphysical realism and conventionalism constitute a false dichotomy, 
and that reality contains intriguingly inference-binding structures. 
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Introduction 
Much development in twentieth century analytic philosophy is arguably driven by working out 
the semantics underlying truth. A widely-held representationalist model of language holds that 
its primary purpose is to state “facts” in mind-independent reality, and thus the model naturally 
accompanies a certain metaphysical realism. It has shaped metaphysics, metaethics and 
numerous other philosophical areas to an extent hard to appreciate unless one steps outside 
representationalism  not an easy task. 
     It‟s worth noting that the criteria for whether propositions are fact-stating underwent 
significant evolution. For early logical positivists, all statements were divided into those with 
“literal significance” and those without, and the former were so by virtue of offering “empirical 
hypotheses” 1 . Thus “The cat is on the mat” is literally significant because a cat-on-mat  
experience might be had in relevant situations. However, crisp criteria for genuinely empirical 
hypotheses were harder to find than the logical positivists initially supposed. So Quine presented 
another, more „purely semantic‟ criterion of factuality: if a literally significant discourse were 
regularized into a single theory in first-order logic, its bound variables would have values.
2
 Now 
“The cat is on the mat” is factual because in  x(Cx & Oxm) suitably interpreted, x binds to 
George.  
     Meanwhile, various philosophers opposed this broad mainstream consensus with forms of 
antirealism which questioned whether if many important areas of human thought, e.g. ethics, 
were regularized into first order logic (if this were even possible), they would yield suitably 
denoting variables. Thus they opposed metaphysical realism with some form of conventionalism 
arguing that terms such as „the Good‟, or „God‟, rather than denoting existent objects, possess 
other entrenched, assertion-warranting social functions. Pragmatism, instrumentalism and much 
later-Wittgensteinian thought all fall under this heading. This dialectic between metaphysical 
realism and conventionalism concerning the denotation of philosophically contested terms runs 
deep through 20
th
 century philosophy.  
     So much for truth. What semantics underlies logical validity? Reasoning from premises to 
conclusion seems somehow to consist in more than the component propositions‟ individual 
assertions of fact, insofar as the premises justify the conclusion. This issue famously troubled the 
very representationalist early Wittgenstein, leading him to declare logic transcendental
3
. This  
was not enthusiastically embraced by his successors, however, and recently new approaches to 
the „foundations of logic‟ have emerged. These include a model-theoretic account which argues 
that a conclusion follows from premises if it is true in every model in which they are (effectively 
enfolding validity into representationalism by extending the latter to other possible worlds), and 
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an inferentialism which argues that conclusion follows from premises if it may be derived from 
them by step-wise application of primitive inference-rules (where one might argue the essence of 
logical validity remains unreduced).
4
   
     This paper offers a different, expressivist, approach. Contra the model-theoretic account, it 
argues that logical form is not in any way denoted. Contra standard inferentialism, it argues that 
to fully understand logical form we need to unpack even for the simplest inferential forms what it 
makes us do. 
 
Achilles and the Tortoise: ‘The Hardness of the Logical Must’ 
ARG)   Socrates is a human being.    PREMISE:  P1 
      All human beings can be killed. PREMISE:  P2 
      Therefore Socrates can be killed. CONCLUSION: C 
In an argument such as this most rational English speakers see a pattern which inclines them to 
do something, namely, if they believe or suppose P1 and P2, to infer C. How does this work? 
What makes it happen? (And what do we mean by „make‟?) Lewis Carroll‟s justly famed fable 
of Achilles and the Tortoise
5
 confronts these questions. It adroitly highlights both the existence 
and the puzzlement of a certain feature of our necessary reasoning, namely a bindingness on the 
actions of rational agents (specifically their inferencing) which appears a-causal, yet nonetheless 
intriguingly compelling. 
     The two mythical racers contemplate a valid argument, such as ARG)
6
. The Tortoise asks 
Achilles what he would say to someone who accepts the premises but not the conclusion. 
Achilles has surprising trouble with this. He writes down a conditional to express what he sees as 
manifestly true and missed by the Tortoise: 
COND1):  If  P1 and  P2 are true, then  C must be true. 
The Tortoise then asks what difference this inscription makes to what he should do with respect 
to inferring  C, even if he accepts  P1 and  P2. Achilles resorts to a further written conditional: 
COND2):  If  P1 and  P2 and  COND1 are true, then  C must be true. 
which fails to move the Tortoise, and so on through further conditionals towards infinity, with 
the impasse never resolved. 
     Achilles sees the Tortoise as recalcitrant as his slow companion refuses to be bound by a 
clearly valid argument. The Tortoise seems to understand the premises, yet inferring C is 
something he refuses to do. Here one glimpses an internalism about logic, whose analogy to 
metaethics is arguably no accident, whereby if one is not motivated to act by logical norms, it 
seems that one does not fully understand them. Yet via his recalcitrance the Tortoise usefully 
makes the binding process  normally invisible due to its ubiquity  visible. 
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     We have seen that the disparity between Achilles and the Tortoise cannot be remedied by  
further explanatory signs, as the conditionals tend to infinity. I suggest that what is now exposed 
is a structural isomorphism shared by a written sign (ARG)) and an act (inferring C from P1 
and P2). This might seem a curious idea. Yet the fact that the further conditional statements are 
useless shows that what is seen by Achilles must be already present in ARG) and the way he acts 
on it. But how? I will argue: by means of a special kind of sign which current 
representationalism overlooks.  
 
Iconic Signs: Not Symbolic, or Indexical 
Peirce distinguished three kinds of sign by the way in which the sign picks out its object, and 
thus gains meaning.
7
 Symbols gain meaning by some arbitrary habit or convention which must be 
learned (e.g. “banana” in English). All words are symbolic to some degree. However as Perry 
showed
8
, language also includes signs which pick out objects by some direct „indicating‟ or 
„pointing‟ relationship (e.g. “here”). Peirce called them indices.  Less discussed today is Peirce‟s 
third kind of sign. Icons are signs which resemble what they signify. These are not symbols, as 
resemblances need not be established by convention. Examples include, crucially, diagrams 
which function by mimicking the structures they signify  whose parts (as Peirce puts it) bear the 
same relationship to one another as the parts of the object they represent.  
     Drawing on this distinction, I will make two key claims. Firstly, ARG) considered as a whole 
serves as an icon.
9
 In some very general sense the juxtaposition of those three propositions has 
an internal structure by appreciating which we see that if P1 and P2 are true, C must be. 
Necessary reasoning is in essence just a recognition that a certain structure has the particular 
structure it has, and formal logic is famously structural. Secondly, an icon, or „logical diagram‟, 
and its object share partial identity. This is not true for indices and symbols. Since indices serve 
as a pure pointer, whatever internal properties they might have are irrelevant to their signification, 
and symbols have nothing in common with their objects by definition since their establishing 
convention is arbitrary. But as icons represent their objects by resembling them, the basis of that 
resemblance must be some shared property. Thus Peirce wrote: “…a pure icon does not draw any 
distinction between itself and its object… whatever it is like, it in so far is.”10 
     Metaphysically speaking, insofar as one follows ARG), written sign and act of inference 
partake in a larger structure: logical form. Thus what explains the intriguing bindingness between 
sign and inference which Achilles grasps but cannot explain to the Tortoise is identity. What else 
could explain it? Thus in an important sense the Tortoise fails to read ARG) at all.   
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Showing Logical Form.  
Logical form may be recorded in signs such as ARG) and presented to the human mind so that it 
can be understood and acted upon. And what more could we ask in order to say that a system of 
signs represents something, or has genuine content? Yet ARG) does not state logical form in any 
sense fitting 20th century representationalism. Pace the logical positivists, it does not offer an 
empirical hypothesis. Pace Quine, when P1, P2 and C are assembled, the structure does not gain 
its validity by denoting further objects, over and above those denoted by the individual 
propositions. What are the implications of this expressivism for realism about logic? For 
instance, does it show that logic does not „talk about real mind-independent things‟? No, but I 
shall argue our notion of „real mind-independent things‟ requires some surgery. 
     It was noted that much analytic philosophy is semantics-driven. Metaphysical realists 
sometimes rightly express discomfort about this, as it would seem their very realism should lead 
them to separate semantics and metaphysics. I claim: actually it is fine to derive one‟s 
metaphysics from one‟s semantics – just please get a less simplistic semantics! We may 
understand Quine‟s criterion of ontological commitment in Peircean terms as an attempt to place 
the full burden of representing reality onto indexical signs. This leads philosophers with realist 
sympathies to ask questions such as: “Does term X [e.g. “the Good”, “God”…] denote an 
existent object?”, and it often seems hard to answer “yes” for key terms in manifestly important 
human discourses. On the other hand, we have seen those unsatisfied with metaphysical 
realism‟s problematization of such areas often counter with a conventionalism which argues the 
term does not denote but has some other socially sanctioned and taught function. We may 
understand such conventionalism in Peircean terms as trying to understand all signification as  
symbolic.  
     Metaphysical realism and conventionalism are assumed to be polar opposites. In so many 
dialectics in so many philosophy papers an argument against metaphysical realism is assumed 
without question to be an argument for conventionalism, and vice versa. But this dichotomy is 
false. A third kind of signification exists which does not consist in brute denotation or arbitrary 
convention, but presents structure directly to the mind‟s eye. It is barely glimpsed in formal 
semantics today. Yet it is this kind of sign that represents logical form – hardly a trivial part of 
our conceptual scheme. If we could only recognize that the symbol, index and icon all have a 
unique and irreducible semantic role, and that reality correspondingly comprises real habits, real 
particulars and real structures, we could take an unanticipated leap towards understanding this 
most contested term.  
 
